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1. Introduction
The efficiency problem of Europe’s armed forces is well known: of an impressive
overall number of over two million men and women in uniform in the EU-27,
only a meagre 10 to 15% are estimated to be deployable. The causes are mani-
fold: the low cost-effectiveness of a plethora of small-scale capabilities, unnec-
essary intra-EU duplications, the presence of large numbers of quasi non-
deployable conscripts, capability gaps in terms of ‘enablers’ (strategic transport,
command, control and communications), and, although all EU Member States
are conscious of the challenge and are implementing measures, slow transforma-
tion nonetheless from territorial defence to expeditionary warfare. The question
must be asked whether the existing mechanisms, in ESDP as well as NATO, are
sufficient to achieve the required transformation within a reasonable timeframe.
This paper will argue (1) that the primary cause of this problematic state of
affairs is the still almost exclusively national focus of defence planning, while
capability gaps at the aggregate EU- and NATO-level are being ignored, and (2)
that the only way to achieve the quantum leap that is necessary to realise defence
transformation is through pooling which, by reducing intra-European duplica-
tions, can produce much more deployable capabilities within the current com-
bined defence budget. From that point of view, it will analyse the potential of
Permanent Structured Cooperation,1 the new mechanism to be established by
the Lisbon Treaty for ‘those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil
higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another
in this area with a view to the most demanding missions’ (Art. 28A §6). One
could argue that the solutions to Europe’s capability conundrum are in effect
well known – the question is whether PermStrucCoop can be the platform that
convinces the Member States to implement them.
Sven BISCOP2
1. Even in a text as full of jargon as the Treaty on European Union, Permanent Structured Cooper-
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2. PermStrucCoop in the Lisbon Treaty
The text of the Treaty certainly is ambitious, which underlines the political sig-
nificance of PermStrucCoop as a statement of conviction vis-à-vis ESDP. The
preamble to the Protocol attached to the Treaty that outlines the objectives of
PermStrucCoop and the criteria for participation speaks of “a more assertive
Union role in security and defence matters” and even of “embarking on a new
stage in the development of the European security and defence policy”. The
Protocol’s Article 1 translates this into two objectives, one general, i.e. to pro-
ceed “more intensively” with capability development, and one specific, i.e. to
supply (part of) a battle group by 2010.
Article 2 then states how these objectives are to be achieved, or in other words
what the Member States willing to take part in PermStrucCoop should commit to:
– To agree on objectives for the level of investment in defence equipment;
– To “bring their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possi-
ble”, by harmonizing military needs, pooling, and, “where appropriate”,
specialization;
– To enhance their forces’ availability, interoperability, flexibility and deploy-
ability, notably by setting “common objectives regarding the commitment of
forces”;
– To address the shortfalls identified by the Capability Development Mecha-
nism (CDM), including through multinational approaches;
– To take part, “where appropriate”, in equipment programmes in the context
of the European Defence Agency (EDA).
The final Article 3 states that the EDA “shall contribute to” a regular assessment
of participating Member States’ contributions.
From the general nature of the wording of the Protocol and the absence of any
figures it is evident that the crucial decisions have yet to be made: how to oper-
ationalize the commitments of Article 2 and translate them into concrete criteria
for participation?
One thing is clear though: PermStrucCoop must be inclusive, allowing as many
Member States as possible to participate. This was the consensus that emerged
from the political debate following initial proposals in the European Conven-
tion in 2002 for a “defence Euro-zone”, which had a much more exclusive fla-
vour to them but provoked fears of too deep divisions within the EU.3 Inclusive-
3. European Convention, Final Report of Working Group VIII – Defence (CONV 461/02). Brus-
sels, Convention Secretariat, 16 December 2002.PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION AND THE FUTURE OF ESDP
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ness seems to be the right choice, for the more Member States participate, the
greater the potential for the creation of synergies and effects of scale and thus
the more added value. The best PermStrucCoop is that at 27, to borrow a Bel-
gian general’s boutade. An all too exclusive avant-garde of just a few like-
minded Member States – if those could be found – could probably achieve
deeper integration and would thus yield more immediate results, but those
would equally probably be obscured by the negative political fall-out which it
would generate, as it would be likely to widen the intra-EU divide between those
more and those less in favour of ESDP. Alternatively, PermStrucCoop between
France, Germany, the UK, Spain, Italy and Poland, as apparently proposed by
certain French and, earlier, Spanish actors,4 would not just ignore the potential
of the other countries and the proportionately large contributions to ESDP oper-
ations of many of them, but, by pitting the “big six” against the smaller Member
States, would be very divisive. Such an idea goes directly against the spirit of the
European project.
The justifiable choice for inclusiveness carries with it a risk though. It must not
lead to setting the bar for participation so low that it no longer entails any com-
mitment to make additional efforts on behalf of the Member States. If one can
participate by virtue of one’s existing capabilities, without having to undertake
to increase the number of deployable forces, PermStrucCoop serves no purpose.
The challenge therefore is to reconcile inclusiveness and commitment, to agree
on criteria that allow all Member States to participate, each at his own level of
means, but that do imply a substantial commitment to make available more
usable capabilities.
4. Lucia Kubosova, “France to Push for Intervention Force Created by EU Big Six”. In: EU
Observer, 15 February 2008.7
3. Committing Criteria
Attempting to define criteria that reconcile serious commitment with maximum
participation, three considerations arise:
1. General budgetary criteria are either evidently unfeasible or by themselves
cannot be expected to yield substantial results in terms of accelerated trans-
formation. Setting a defence budget of 2% GDP as threshold for participa-
tion e.g. – an often mentioned figure – will lead to PermStrucCoop between
just France, the UK, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. For countries like Ger-
many and Belgium, this amounts to almost a doubling of the defence budget
– which will not happen. Alternatively, achieving a sound balance between
personnel costs, operational costs and investments within the defence budget
– like the often cited 50-25-25 division – is very laudable, but has been a goal
of many Member States for a long time and has not proved to be easily
achievable, nor has it directly generated additional capabilities. Limited
defence budgets and the need for a socially acceptable solution to personnel
issues mean that only a very slow evolution towards the “ideal” balance – if
that überhaupt exists – is possible.
2. In the same vein, criteria applied to the whole of participating States’ armed
forces appear to have limited potential for achieving concrete results within
a reasonable timeframe. The objective of 40% deployability and 8% sustain-
ability, i.e. 40% of the armed forces have to be deployable and one fifth of
those or 8% of the total must be deployed at any one time, seems equally
laudable but has been cited for years, notably with regard to land forces,
without triggering substantial improvements. The means for a quantum leap
in the whole of the armed forces at once are simply not available in any
Member State.
3. For the same reason, it does not seem realistic to demand Member States to
fulfil all criteria at the moment of entry into PermStrucCoop. The compari-
son with monetary union can illustrate this: if all convergence criteria had to
be fulfilled at the moment of entry, many long-standing members of the
Eurozone would still not have been able to join the single currency.
Criteria must be quantifiable and verifiable to have an impact. But for criteria
to be achievable by a majority of Member States and to have the potential to
drive transformation and produce additional deployable capabilities in the
medium term, at the same time:
1. They have to be aimed at precise qualitative objectives.
2. They must apply to the specific capabilities for which Member States under-
take commitments in the framework of PermStrucCoop, to the precise tar-
gets that they set for themselves, rather than to the total of their armed
forces.PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION AND THE FUTURE OF ESDP
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3. They must be results-oriented commitments, to be realized by an agreed
deadline.
The next question then is: which precise qualitative objectives is PermStrucCoop
to achieve? This must not be answered in terms of input – what is each Member
State offering to contribute, i.e. without further ado replicating the bottom-up
approach of the Headline Goal, which would simply result in another catalogue
of theoretically available forces. The answer must be output-driven, i.e. which
tasks do the Member States want to be able to do together, how do they want
to be able to do these, and which sum total of capabilities is needed to that end?
The EDA, which is given an important role in the Protocol, can provide this
task-oriented basis on which each Member State can found the definition of its
objectives in joining PermStrucCoop. Of course, these objectives will also be
determined by which capabilities are already available, and by how many addi-
tional capabilities can realistically be expected. But in which areas the additional
capabilities are to be created should be driven by the EDA-identified priorities
on the basis of which tasks to be performed and how.
The end-result should be that in an agreed number of years and thus at a quicker
pace than at present, in a number of agreed fields, more deployable capabilities
are available then today, enabling the EU to implement its military tasks at a
higher level then today in terms of numbers of troops and numbers of operations
and to do so more effectively and efficiently.9
4. Contributing to PermStrucCoop
The definition of the tasks to which the objectives of PermStrucCoop must be
geared is also provided by the Lisbon Treaty, which in Article 28B §1 extends,
or perhaps better said, defines in more detail the Petersberg Tasks: basically all
military operations, across the full spectrum – including ‘the most demanding
missions’, as mentioned in the Protocol – except for collective territorial defence.
Within that framework, the broadest guidance, at horizon 2025, is provided by
the EDA’s Long-Term Vision, which for six broad capability domains – com-
mand, inform, engage, protect, deploy and sustain – prescribes the characteris-
tics of future capabilities: synergy, agility, selectivity and sustainability.
Different options for participation then present themselves; each Member State
can select one or more of these:
1. The most immediate capability objective is to close the remaining shortfalls
in the various specific capability areas listed in the Progress Catalogue. The
lowest threshold for a Member State to participate in PermStrucCoop would
thus be the willingness to contribute to that aim in one or more of those
specific capability areas.
2. More broadly, participating Member States could also undertake to increase
the deployability of existing units combining a range of capability areas, in
other words to contribute a force package – today there exist many forma-
tions, often large-scale, that are not deployable and hence do not constitute
a capability. E.g. Belgium has set the objective of achieving the deployability
of one of its two army brigades, an aim that obviously concerns a number of
capability areas. The aim need not necessarily be to create more stand-by
forces – almost all Member States already fulfil the second objective of
PermStrucCoop, i.e. taking part in a battle group, while the difficulties of the
NATO Response Force (NRF) to achieve its desired strength of 21,000 show
that in the current state of European capabilities, too large stand-by forces
that are exclusively tied to one organization and cannot be deployed in other
frameworks limit rather than enhance Europe’s ability to do operations.
3. More broadly still and existing force structures and capabilities set aside,
Member States could adopt a more prospective approach and start planning
for future capabilities. In this regard in particular the new Capability Devel-
opment Plan (CDP) elaborated by the EDA can inform them. The four
strands of the CDP are to provide the framework for planning at the national
level, to function as a “plan for planning”: the Headline Goal 2010, i.e. exist-
ing capability objectives in the short to medium term; the technology trends,
informing Member States which capabilities might be possible in the longer
term; lessons learnt from operations in various frameworks (ESDP, NATOPERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION AND THE FUTURE OF ESDP
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etc.); and a database of Member States’ current longer term plans and pro-
grammes.
Of major importance in all three options is the guidance provide by the EDA, in
order to ensure that commitments are anchored in the EU framework, i.e. are
focused on the capability shortfalls at the aggregate EU-level that are relevant
for the EU’s military tasks, rather than being based on national considerations
only without reference to combined needs.
Rather than applying to the whole of the participating Member States’ armed
forces, criteria can then be tailored to the specific contribution each aims to
make to PermStrucCoop and that regardless of the quantity of a Member State’s
planned contribution, allowing each to contribute at his own level of means.
Thus criteria could set standards for the deployability, sustainability and inter-
operability of each contribution, however large or small. One can also imagine
a minimal per capita investment in defence equipment for each contribution.
Setting criteria only makes sense though if capabilities are pre-identified, for
otherwise no effective evaluation by the EDA as foreseen in the Protocol is pos-
sible. This evaluation must be real indeed, for the Treaty foresees that partici-
pating Member States that no longer fulfil the criteria can be excluded.
PermStrucCoop can build on the experience of the battle groups, which intro-
duced the notion of pre-identified units in ESDP. Setting criteria applying to the
specific pre-identified contributions of each Member State will bring real added
value as compared to the existing “catalogue system” of ESDP.11
5. Contributing through Pooling
Equally important again for all three options is that Member States can choose
to achieve the objectives that they set for themselves on a national basis, by
improving and creating national capabilities, but can also opt for pooling of
assets with other participating Member States in order to create multinational
capabilities.
One of the main causes of the low deployability of Europe’s armed forces is that
national thinking still dominates defence planning: most Member States aim to
maintain a wide range of nationally organized capabilities in army, navy and air
force, and take little or no account of EU – or, for that matter, NATO – guide-
lines in their national decision-making process. But because in most Member
States the scale of the armed forces and the size of the defence budget are limited,
this leads to what Pilegaard has tellingly dubbed ‘mini-mass armies’:5 Member
States maintain the structures of their larger Cold War-time armed forces, but
without the numbers below those structures to actually make up all the units.
The overall result is one of fragmentation, duplication and very low cost-effec-
tiveness. Only limited quantities of each capability can be maintained, but each
small-scale deployable capability needs supporting services and many of the
overhead costs are fixed: whether a Member State operates 1 or 100 tanks or
fighters – in both cases a base is needed, personnel must be recruited and trained,
supplies bought, and the paperwork done… If only 10 to 15% of Member
States’ armed forces are deployable, it is because small-scale capabilities cannot
man a full rotation cycle if full units (battalions, squadrons) are deployed and
will afterwards be out of the loop for a longer time or alternatively will only
deploy sub-units in very limited numbers. Too large a share of personnel is
devoted to overhead and supporting services that are unnecessarily duplicated
within the EU – the true duplication debate. The budgets that are absorbed by
those unnecessary duplications cannot be spent on the ongoing transformation
from territorial defence to expeditionary warfare, which requires investment in
equipment, recruitment, and training and manoeuvres – needs that are reflected
in the capability shortfalls.
Pooling of assets, which is included in the Protocol on PermStrucCoop, appears
the only way to overcome this problem of fragmentation and should therefore
be actively stimulated. PermStrucCoop could thus function as a forum – a mar-
riage agency – identifying opportunities for cooperation between Member States
5. Jess Pilegaard, ‘The European Security and Defence Policy and the Development of a Security
Strategy for Europe’. In: Jess Pilegaard (ed.), The Politics of European Security. Copenhagen, Dan-
ish Institute of International Studies, 2004, pp. 11-38.PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION AND THE FUTURE OF ESDP
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once they have declared their intention to contribute in one or more areas,
through one or more of the options described in §4. Such cooperation can take
different forms, from joint procurement projects in order to equip national for-
mations, to the creation of pooled multinational formations, and joint R&T
projects. Obviously, pooling cannot be but voluntary. Furthermore, not all
Member States participating in PermStrucCoop must cooperate in all fields: if
Member States A, B, C and D find they share an interest in capability area X and
establish a form of cooperation (i), at the same time Member States C, D, E and
F can have a shared interest in area Y and cooperate in the form of (i), (ii) or
(iii). A number of overlapping clusters would thus emerge, with the EDA
responsible for maintaining the overview and evaluating contributions. The
fourth strand of the CDP, the database of Member States’ plans and pro-
grammes, will be of particular importance in this regard. Thus the aim is not
that PermStrucCoop as a whole would constitute one single – e.g. corps-sized –
force package that can be deployed as such. It is a framework, a tool, for capa-
bility development, not for operations – although one may reasonably expect
those who participate to show more willingness to participate in operations.
In many areas, cooperation, including pooling, does not have to start from
scratch but can be based on existing initiatives that can be widened and deep-
ened. The least sensitive field is probably that of training, where many countries
already cooperate, e.g. France and Belgium for the training of pilots; additional
synergies should be easy to find. In the field of logistics and support, many ini-
tiatives exist as well, but more can be done. An interesting model could be the
creation of the European Air Transport Command (EATC) by Belgium, France,
Germany and the Netherlands, which will assume effective command over a
certain share of the transport aircraft of the participating countries. This exam-
ple of pooling could be both deepened, by gradually transferring a larger share
of national capability to EATC as well as by integrating further fields such as
maintenance etc., and widened, by inviting additional countries to participate.
In February 2008 the EDA Steering Board notably decided to set up a project
team to investigate how to develop a “European Air Transport Fleet” through
pooled ownership of the new A400M transport aircraft that several Member
States are acquiring.6 Fighter aircraft are the next logical field for cooperation:
one can imagine that Member States that are struggling to preserve a capability
in this area – an objective which in itself is justifiable – could more easily remain
active in this field, and like Belgium e.g. could in the future replace their current
aircraft, if they pool their efforts to build one multinational fighter force to
6. EU Governments Seek to Improve Air Transport Capacity for Military Operations. EDA Press
Release, 15 February 2008.PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION AND THE FUTURE OF ESDP
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which each participating country contributes (a number of) “national” squad-
rons but which is supported by single integrated logistics, maintenance etc.
If the actual combat units thus remain national – and there is no need for mul-
tinationalization below the squadron or battalion level – synergies can still be
found by anchoring these in a multinational structure – wing or brigade – with
single multinational support and logistics behind it, creating substantial syner-
gies and effects of scale, as well as integrated command & control arrangements.
This can apply to the army as well. The objective of achieving full deployability
of a Belgian brigade e.g. can be more easily achieved if that brigade is more fully
anchored in the Eurocorps, and the Belgian support structures merged into one
Eurocorps structure. Such formats link back to some of the more constructive
Convention proposals, which mentioned “participation in multinational forces
with integrated command and control capabilities” as a possible focus for
PermStrucCoop. An added advantage of contributing to PermStrucCoop not
simply with pre-identified assets, but by pooling those, is that force packages
can be created which include pre-identified arrangements and options for com-
mand & control – see e.g. the current debate on the role of the Eurocorps’ FHQ
– and for strategic transport. In a way, such forms of pooling are a continuation
of the battle groups, a major experiment in military integration, but now at a
larger scale. The battle groups actually predict the pattern of the clusters that are
likely to emerge, for in the battle groups the “usual suspects”, those that have a
tradition of working together, have already found each other – witness the battle
group based on the framework nations that also constitute the Eurocorps.
Pooling can actually increase Member States’ sovereignty. Today, many Member
States on their own are no longer capable of mounting a sizable operation of
some duration – the sovereignty that some cling to is largely illusory. Through
pooling however, the efficiency of the national defence budgets can be substan-
tially enhanced, i.e. in term pooling will generate more deployable capabilities
within the same budget, and will allow Member States to continue to remain
active in a broader range of capability fields, but each at his own level of means.
Furthermore, it allows them to operate at levels, e.g. the corps, which are
beyond the scope of their national armed forces. As essentially command &
control and support & logistics would be merged while the frontline battalions
and squadrons would each still be composed of one nationality, there would be
sufficient flexibility to allow Member States not to commit frontline capabilities
to every operation in which the multinational formation takes part; e.g. an inte-
grated FHQ can still run national operations, as is the case in Admiral Benelux,
the far-reaching integration of the Dutch and Belgian navies. Vice versa the pos-
sibility of contributing only through the multinational command & control orPERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION AND THE FUTURE OF ESDP
14
support structures would make it easier for Member States to support more
operations.
As pooling gradually progresses, certain national structures in the field of sup-
port and command & control will be abolished in order to be merged into mul-
tinational structures, thus deepening integration as compared to most existing
multinational formations, such as the Eurocorps today, which apart from small
permanent elements – in the case of the Eurocorps, the FHQ – are a catalogue
of forces without too many links between them, just as much as ESDP as a
whole. If joining a multinational formation means nothing more than a new
shoulder patch, no synergies and effects of scale and thus no added value will be
created. In term, this process may lead to co-location of certain structures, going
beyond HQs, on a reduced number of bases, entailing that for the Eurocorps e.g.
a share of Belgian, Spanish and Luxembourg personnel hitherto based in their
own countries might find themselves serving in bases in France or Germany.
However, as many Member States, including Belgium, have had a very large
share of their forces serving abroad, notably in Germany, for several decades,
that ought not to pose a problem.15
6. An EU-NATO-Neutral Project
PermStrucCoop is about creating more deployable capabilities in Europe, an
objective that benefits both ESDP and NATO, as well as the UN, for even if they
are generated through pooling, all of these capabilities can be deployed in all of
these frameworks. Vice versa, capabilities generated in the NATO framework
should also benefit European deployment in an ESDP or UN context, e.g. the
initiative by seventeen NATO members and partners to purchase four Boeing
C17 transport aircraft in order to create a Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC). In
that sense, PermStrucCoop is basically neutral vis-à-vis the eternal EU-NATO
debate.
That does not mean however that it will not have any effect on the relationship
between the two. Currently, coordination on capability development between
the EU and NATO is very limited, because of political blockages at the highest
level. It is often said that this lack of coordination is less problematic than it
seems, because as they identify the same capability gaps, the EU and NATO
obviously come up with very similar guidelines. More realistically perhaps it
could be said that it is not problematic simply because Member States largely
ignore both NATO and EU guidelines anyway – the actual impact of either on
national defence planning is marginal. PermStrucCoop has the potential to
change that, because of the opportunity to set self-defined but concrete and ver-
ifiable objectives and to foster cooperation and pooling, and that within the
Treaty, thus allowing the active involvement of EU institutions such as the EDA
and, more generally, embedding defence in the overall political project of the
EU. If PermStrucCoop succeeds in realizing that potential, it will have an impor-
tant and gradually increasing impact on national decisions. The question then
is: where does that leave NATO defence planning? In that event, a reconfigura-
tion of defence planning seems in order.
Yet, even such a development need not be seen as a zero-sum game between
NATO and the EU. It would rather signal the gradual evolution, already under-
way, towards a “two-pillar” NATO, composed of two pillars: the US and the
EU. These are the two fully-fledged actors, both addressing the whole of foreign
policy, from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military, and both building
capabilities in all of those areas, which sometimes they will put to use jointly and
sometimes not. The decision-making on Lebanon can serve to illustrate the
trend: the UN having asked a European contribution to peacekeeping after the
2006 war, the European countries debated this, and decided to act – in the con-
text of the EU, increasingly the political centre of gravity. Once that political
decision taken, the framework in which to implement it was chosen – NATO,
ESDP or the UN – which is an ad hoc decision, in function of what is most suitedPERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION AND THE FUTURE OF ESDP
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to the case at hand – in the case of Lebanon, to send blue helmets. In view of this
trend, and given the problem of the fragmentation of Europe’s defence effort
and the potential offered by cooperation and integration among Europeans, it
would seem logical that the EU Member States would increasingly build an ever
more coordinated defence capacity in the ESDP context, which in those cases
where the EU and the US decide to act jointly serves as the European military
pillar within NATO.
In such a scenario, the US would lose a degree of influence, for it would be
natural for an increasingly capable Europe to expect an increased say in deci-
sion-making – eventually one could even imagine the EU speaking with one
voice in NATO. But the US would gain a much more capable partner with
whom real burden-sharing, a long-standing US demand, would be possible.
Recent declarations by Victoria Nuland, US Permanent Representative to
NATO, appear to indicate that US thinking might be shifting in this direction.7
Pointing to the need for “a Europe that is as united as possible, ready and willing
to bear its full measure of responsibility for defending our common security”,
Ambassador Nuland called for “a stronger, more capable European defense
capacity”, for “an ESDP with only soft power is not enough” – adding that
“coalitions of the willing have their limitations”. If this is the course to be fol-
lowed, the best a US administration could do is simply to tell the more Atlantic-
oriented European countries not to worry about the impact on NATO or on
their relationship with Washington, not to see things in terms of a zero-sum
game, but to go ahead and participate fully in enhancing European capabilities
through ESDP, for the US to afterwards have a real partner.
7. Victoria Nuland, Speech at the London School of Economics, 25 February 2008. She gave a sim-
ilar speech at the Press Club in Paris on 22 February.17
7. Looking Forward: 
An EU Military Strategy?
The primary question underlying PermStrucCoop thus is not whether the EU
should act through ESDP, NATO or the UN – that will always be an ad hoc
decision – but what the EU’s military level of ambition is. What does Europe as
a whole want to be able to do? Yet this is precisely where today there is a lack
of vision: the Petersberg Tasks define the types of operations the EU wants to
undertake, but not the scale. Quantitatively, ESDP is still limited to the 1999
Headline Goal, i.e. the aim to be able to project and sustain for a year 60,000
troops, which of course requires 3 times as many front-line troops, in view of
rotation, plus the various support services. But, there is no vision on the total
combined armed forces of the EU-27 – 2 million troops. Furthermore, if all
ongoing operations in which EU Member States participate are counted, Europe
already today deploys more than 60,000.
This means that even if today a task- or output-oriented approach to PermStruc-
Coop is adopted, capability development is still to some extent taking place in
a void, because the official ambition in terms of output relates only to the Head-
line Goal – not to the 2 million. It also means that there is a missing link between
capability development and the overall political objectives defined in the 2003
European Security Strategy (ESS), which are very ambitious: “Europe should be
ready to share in the responsibility for global security”. But what does that
responsibility entail, in concrete terms? Ideally therefore, a wider political deci-
sion is in order, translating the ESS in a military level of ambition based on the
full military potential of all Member States: whether they act through ESDP,
NATO or the UN, how many forces should the EU-27 be able to muster for
crisis management as well as for long-term peacekeeping, which reserves does
this require, and which capacity must be maintained for territorial defence?
Such a military – or perhaps better, civil-military – sub-strategy to the ESS would
constitute a much more concrete framework within which the CDP can guide
Member States’ efforts, be they national or multinational.19
8. Summary and Conclusion
PermStrucCoop can be a very flexible instrument, allowing all EU Member
States to participate, if they so choose, at their own level of means, in the way
that they choose:
– Member States wanting to take part can declare which contribution, of
which size, in which timeframe they are considering: in which specific capa-
bility areas, and/or with which force packages, and/or with regard to which
longer-term, future capabilities.
– Simultaneously, the participating Member States, with the support of the
EDA, can agree on criteria that apply to each specific contribution, regard-
less of size, in terms of deployability, sustainability, interoperability and per
capita investment in equipment.
– The EDA can then assess the opportunities for different forms of cooperation
and pooling in function of Member States’ declared intentions, allowing
Member States to decide which contributions they will offer on a national
basis and which in cooperation, in which format, with other Member States.
– This will result in a set of concrete capability objectives, to be achieved by
pre-identified units, some national, some multinational, in an agreed time-
frame.
– The EDA is responsible for monitoring progress and assessing contributions
against the agreed criteria and the evolving needs, as well as continuously
updating and proposing opportunities for cooperation, in function of the
CDP.
PermStrucCoop is not the silver bullet that will solve all problems of Europe’s
military. But because it is in the Treaty and Member States therefore have to
consider whether and how to make use of it, it presents a window of opportu-
nity to further ESDP. If a critical mass of Member States willing to go ahead with
PermStrucCoop can be found, the desire to “be in” will probably lead many
others to participate. Once in, peer pressure and the need to avoid exclusion for
no longer fulfilling the criteria should stimulate Member States’ efforts. The
only “carrot” that can stimulate Member States to set demanding criteria in the
first place however is the one that should appeal to Finance Ministers: the poten-
tial of increasing the efficiency of the defence budget. PermStrucCoop is not an
end in itself, but a means towards generating more deployable forces – which
itself is only a means towards deploying Europe’s forces in the service of global
peace and security. Ultimately therefore, even if the capabilities are available,
political willingness, to commit troops where necessary and to act as EU, is the
key. But the more integrated Europe’s military capabilities will be, the more EU
Member States will be pushed to act as one.